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Wild Chatbots: Quantifying Vulnerabilities of LLM Customer Service Chatbots on the Web

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I. TL;DR

In this measurement study, we identify thousands of websites that deploy LLM-based chatbot plugins with serious vulnerabilities.

1. 8 of the 20 plugins in our study, used by over 1500 websites, fail to verify the chat history. This allows an adversary to manipulate the bot by fabricating a fake history.
2. Three plugins, used by over 500 websites, expose system prompts (considered intellectual property) directly in HTTP request made from the client.
3. Three plugins, used by over 250 university websites, expose admin-provided documents verbatim containing potentially non-public information (e.g. email addresses)

II. Why Are Custom LLM Chatbots Less Secure than Your ChatGPT.com Interface?

Robust LLM Environments (OpenAI)

1. Created by handful of major players with expertise
2. Safety alignment is last layer of training
3. Easy testing due to defined APIs means idealized setting for security research
4. Constant updates and patches

Vulnerable LLM Environments (Web)

1. Deployed by non-experts following the hype
2. Customization happens on top of alignment, potentially destabilizing it
3. Hard security testing due to entry barriers: no standard way to probe chatbots
4. Inconsistent updates

III. Vulnerabilities Affecting LLM Chatbots

Fake Chat History: Gaslighting the Chatbot

- Combining LLM and web vulnerabilities exposes a serious flaw in 8 of the 20 plugins we analyze, affecting over 1500 websites in our dataset.
- These plugins handle chat history insecurely through HTTP POST requests. This enables an adversary to trick the chatbot into performing unintended tasks by fabricating a message history i.e. putting words into the chatbot's mouth.



Model Poisoning through Publicly-Modifiable Content (e.g. Reviews)



- Where do LLM chatbots get their customization data? Often, from an automated crawler that scoops up everything on the website. The crawled data can include publicly-modifiable information (like reviews). This allows an adversary to "poison" the model with harmful content.
- In a subset of 28 randomly chosen websites from plugins that offer crawlers, we found one example of poisoning and two sites at risk.

IV. Our Large-Scale Measurements

- We use the July 2024 Common Crawl dataset to scan 7.8 million hostnames belonging to a subset of four million domains from the top ten million by Open PageRank. In total, we identify 3094 websites that embed code for 20 LLM chatbot plugins.
- Currently, we're studying the potential for the Fake Chat History attack to trick a chatbot into performing arbitrary tasks. For example, an adversary could use this attack to create a general-purpose chatbot net:

1. Take the subset of our dataset vulnerable to the Fake Chat History attack
2. Test on five tasks designed to surpass a customer service chatbot's intended purpose
3. Measure the change in success rate after altering chat history

Fake Chat History Attack: Change in Success Rate over Five Tasks



Overview of Our Research Process



V. What Industries Are Using LLM Chatbots?



- To understand which industries are most impacted by LLM chatbot vulnerabilities, we categorize our 3094 websites using a RandomForestClassifier trained on the Kaggle Company Classification dataset.

VI. References

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AI Institute for Agent-based Cyber Threat Intelligence and Operation

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